Countering Protection Rackets Using Legal and Social Approaches: An Agent-Based Test

Protection rackets cause economic and social damage across the world. States typically combat protection rackets using legal strategies that target the racketeers with legislation, strong sentencing, and increasing the presence and involvement of police officers. Nongovernmental organizations, conversely, focus on the rest of the population and counter protection rackets using a social approach. These organisations attempt to change the actions and social norms of community members with education, promotional campaigns, and discussions. We use an agent-based model, which draws on established theories of protection rackets and combines features of sociological and economic perspectives to modelling social interactions, to test the effects of legal and social approaches. We find that a legal approach is a necessary component of a policy approach, that social only approaches should not be used because they lead to large increases in violence, and that a combination of the two works best, although even this must be used carefully

How Social Norms Can Make the World More Regular and Better

Is there any difference between social norms and mere regularities emerging spontaneously from the behaviours of entities that have no norm-based cognition? And if so, which effects do we expect to observe in a world in which agents are endowed with such a type of cognition? The agent-based simulations presented here are aimed to understand what would happen in a world populated by normative agents, able to recognize norms and to reason upon them, compared to other, cognitively, less complex agents, following only their own individual goals

Emergence In the Loop: Simulating the two way dynamics of norm innovation

In this paper we will present the EMIL project, "EMergence In the Loop: Simulating the two-way dynamics of norm innovation", a three-year project funded by the European Commission (Sixth Framework Programme -Information Society and Technologies) in the framework of the initiative "Simulating Emergent Properties in Complex Systems". The EMIL project intends to contribute to the study of social complex systems by modelling norm innovation as a phenomenon implying interrelationships among multiple levels. It shall endeavour to point out that social dynamics in societies of intelligent agents is necessarily bi-directional, which adds complexity to the emergence processes. The micro-macro link will be modelled and observed in the emergence of properties at the macro-level and their immergence into the micro-level units. The main scientific aim of the EMIL project is to construct a simulator for exploring and experimenting norm-innovation

From anarchy to monopoly : how competition and protection shaped mafia's behavior

Mafia-like organizations are highly dynamic and organized criminal groups characterized by their extortive activities that impact societies and economies in different modes and magnitudes. This renders the understanding of how these organizations evolved an objective of both scientific and applicationoriented interests. We propose an agent-based simulation model - the Extortion Racket System model - aimed at understanding the factors and processes explaining the successful settlement of the Sicilian Mafia in Southern Italy, and which may more generally account for the transition from an anarchical situation of uncoordinated extortion to a monopolistic social order. Our results show that in situations of anarchy, these organizations do not last long. This indicates that a monopolistic situation shall be preferred over anarchical ones. Competition is a necessary and sufficient condition for the emergence of a monopolistic situation. However, when competition is combined with protection, the resulting monopolistic regime presents features that make it even more preferable and sustainable for the targets

A convention or (tacit) agreement betwixt us: on reliance and its normative consequences

The aim of this paper is to clarify what kind of normativity characterizes a convention. First, we argue that conventions have normative consequences because they always involve a form of trust and reliance.We contend that it is by reference to a moral principle impinging on these aspects (i.e. the principle of Reliability) that interpersonal obligations and rights originate from conventional regularities. Second, we argue that the system of mutual expectations presupposed by conventions is a source of agreements. Agreements stemming from conventions are "tacit" in the sense that they are implicated by what agents do (or forbear from doing) and without that any communication between them is necessary. To justify this conclusion, we assume that: (1) there is a salient interpretation, in some contexts, of everyone\u27s silence as confirmatory of the others\u27 expectations (an epistemic assumption), and (2) the participating agents share a value of not being motivated by hostile attitudes (a motivational assumption). By clarifying the relation between conventions and agreements, the peculiar normativity of conventions is analyzed

What Do Agent-Based and Equation-Based Modelling Tell Us About Social Conventions: The Clash Between ABM and EBM in a Congestion Game Framework

In this work simulation-based and analytical results on the emergence steady states in traffic-like interactions are presented and discussed. The objective of the paper is twofold: i) investigating the role of social conventions in coordination problem situations, and more specifically in congestion games; ii) comparing simulation-based and analytical results to figure out what these methodologies can tell us on the subject matter. Our main issue is that Agent-Based Modelling (ABM) and the Equation-Based Modelling (EBM) are not alternative, but in some circumstances complementary, and suggest some features distinguishing these two ways of modeling that go beyond the practical considerations provided by Parunak H.V.D., Robert Savit and Rick L. Riolo. Our model is based on the interaction of strategies of heterogeneous agents who have to cross a junction. In each junction there are only four inputs, each of which is passable only in the direction of the intersection and can be occupied only by an agent one at a time. The results generated by ABM simulations provide structured data for developing the analytical model through which generalizing the simulation results and make predictions. ABM simulations are artifacts that generate empirical data on the basis of the variables, properties, local rules and critical factors the modeler decides to implement into the model; in this way simulations allow generating controlled data, useful to test the theory and reduce the complexity, while EBM allows to close them, making thus possible to falsify them.Agent-Based Modelling, Equation-Based Modelling, Congestion Game, Model of Social Phenomena

What is the best approach for preventing recruitment to terrorism? Findings from ABM experiments in social and situational prevention

This study uses agent-based models (ABMs) to compare the impacts of three different types of interventions targeting recruitment to terrorism - community workers at community centers; community-oriented policing; and an employment program for high-risk agents. The first two programs are social interventions that focus on de-radicalization and changing the dispositions of agents in the model, whereas the employment program focuses on "deflection" and represents a situational/opportunity reducing approach to prevention. The results show significant impacts of the community worker and community policing interventions on radicalization but no significant impact on recruitment. In contrast, the employment intervention had a strong and significant impact on recruitment, but little impact on radicalization

Punish and Voice: Punishment Enhances Cooperation when Combined with Norm-Signalling

Material punishment has been suggested to play a key role in sustaining human cooperation. Experimental findings, however, show that inflicting mere material costs does not always increase cooperation and may even have detrimental effects. Indeed, ethnographic evidence suggests that the most typical punishing strategies in human ecologies (e.g., gossip, derision, blame and criticism) naturally combine normative information with material punishment. Using laboratory experiments with humans, we show that the interaction of norm communication and material punishment leads to higher and more stable cooperation at a lower cost for the group than when used separately. In this work, we argue and provide experimental evidence that successful human cooperation is the outcome of the interaction between instrumental decision-making and the norm psychology humans are provided with. Norm psychology is a cognitive machinery to detect and reason upon norms that is characterized by a salience mechanism devoted to track how much a norm is prominent within a group. We test our hypothesis both in the laboratory and with an agent-based model. The agent-based model incorporates fundamental aspects of norm psychology absent from previous work. The combination of these methods allows us to provide an explanation for the proximate mechanisms behind the observed cooperative behaviour. The consistency between the two sources of data supports our hypothesis that cooperation is a product of norm psychology solicited by norm-signalling and coercive devices